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1 Giovanni Maddalena’s The Philosophy of Gesture: Completing Pragmatists’ Incomplete Revolution
1 is an ambitious, original, and creative contribution to the re-evaluation of the history of
pragmatism and its contemporary legacy in various areas of philosophy, ranging from
logic and the theory of reasoning to the philosophy of science and art, as well as ethics
and the philosophy of education. A reader can only admire the author’s broad and deep
knowledge and learning, which extends from the history of philosophy to literature and
natural science. Covering an unusually wide spectrum of topics – many of which are, for
obvious reasons, discussed only briefly – the book offers a highly competent analysis and
further development of Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatism, in particular. Peirce, the founding
father of pragmatism, is clearly Maddalena’s most important philosophical hero, and it is
largely in Peircean terms that he proposes to move on what he takes to be a revolutionary
project in (meta)philosophy.
2 In this brief comment, I will focus on what I take to be the main problem of the book. In
my view, Maddalena gets Kant – and thereby, unavoidably, the pragmatists’ relation to
Kant – seriously wrong. There is,  it  seems to me, a sense in which he finds Kant too
important for  all  post-Kantian  philosophy,  but  at  the  same  time  he  too  easily  and
straightforwardly maintains that we could simply get rid of Kant. Although I agree with
Maddalena’s judgment about the originality of Kant in contrast to Descartes, I think it is
an exaggeration to say that Kant’s project “gives form to the entire mentality of the
contemporary  world”  and that  “modernity  took its  contemporary  form” with Kant’s
Copernican revolution (3). One could suggest, rather, that (post)modernity still needs to
learn a number of  important Kantian lessons;  in particular,  (post)analytic philosophy
should take more seriously the Kantian transcendental method. Yet, on the other hand,
even if  Kant’s  role  was  slightly  more  modest  than  Maddalena claims,  he  is  with  us
(pragmatists) to stay and cannot just be dropped out of any “completed” pragmatism.
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3 In brief, a gesture aiming at a total liberation from the Kantian predicament is a non- or
even  anti-pragmatist  gesture,  because  pragmatism  is,  ineliminably,  a  post-Kantian
philosophical orientation and gets its significance from a largely Kantian framework. No
pragmatist needs to agree with everything – or perhaps, strictly speaking, with anything
– that Kant actually wrote, but the basic critical approach we inherit from Kant cannot be
dispensed with. I cannot argue for this general view here, but I will try to indicate where,
more specifically, Maddalena’s account of Kant and the Kantian legacy of pragmatism is
flawed.
4 One problem with Maddalena’s  conception of  Kant is  that his  statements are far too
general  to  be  useful  in  any  detailed  assessment  of  the  pragmatists’  (or  other
contemporary philosophers’) Kantian influences. For example, when he tells us that for
Kant “reason is the ‘measure of all things’” (5), he fails to note that what Kant, far from
claiming reason to be all-powerful, primarily offers us is a reflexive critique of reason.
Maddalena also misleadingly claims to perceive a link between Kantian morality and
ideology,  even  totalitarianism,  attacking  Kant’s  “intellectualist  and  self-centred
conception of  reality  based  on inner  determination and effort”  (6).  No  serious  Kant
scholar will have much patience with claims like this, as there is nothing “self-centred” in
the  foundations  of  Kantian  ethics:  in  one  formulation,  the  categorical  imperative  of
course urges us to treat humanity in others as well as ourselves as an end in itself, never
as a mere means. Kantian ethics emphasizing the autonomy of the moral subject is as far
from any totalitarianism as an ethical system can be.
5 While it  is  of  course true that  Peirce’s  theory of  representation differs  in important
respects  from Kant’s  and that  Peirce,  unlike Kant,  subscribed to “scholastic  realism”
(7-8),  it  is  not  impossible  to  locate  a  Kantian  strain  in  Peirce’s  argumentation  for
scholastic realism as a necessary condition for the possibility of  scientific inquiry.  In
contrast  to  Peirce,  Kant  famously  maintained  that  there  is  a  “gap”  between human
knowledge  (and  the  phenomena  it  can  reach)  and  reality  as  such  (the  “things-in-
themselves”) (12). However, this is a problematic metaphysical gap only if we assume a
“two worlds” reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism. While this reading is admittedly
becoming more popular again among Kant specialists, the pragmatist should in my view
(without taking any definite stand on what exactly Kant himself thought) prefer the “one
world” (“two aspects”) reading, according to which the distinction between appearances
and things in themselves is not a distinction between two separate metaphysical realms
or sets of objects but a distinction between two different ways of considering one and the
same reality.2 At least, the “unbridgeable gap” metaphor is problematic and would have
to be properly addressed in relation to scholarship questioning the standard two worlds
reading of  Kantian idealism.  There need not  be any fundamental  “lack of  continuity
between cognitive processes and reality” (13) in Kant any more than there is in Peirce.
6 William James notoriously attacks Kantian transcendental idealism in conjunction with
his attack on the Hegelian Absolute, but it is simply wrong to say that “the Absolute is
intellectualist  because  it  derives  from Kant’s  intellectualist  philosophy”  and  “dualist
theology” (15). From the properly Kantian point of view, the Hegelian idealists’ Absolute –
which  James  rightly  and  innovatively  criticized  –  is  a  speculative  metaphysical
postulation illegitimately transgressing the bounds of human reason.
7 Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Maddalena’s view on Kant and Kant’s relation to
the  pragmatists  is  that  he  never  pauses  to  reflect  on  whether  the  pragmatists’
understanding of Kant was accurate at all. He does not critically consider whether the
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classical pragmatists who indeed did reject Kant’s strict apriorism and the unknowability
of the thing in itself, among many other Kantian ideas (cf. 18-9), actually interpreted Kant
correctly. Moreover, and perhaps even more problematically, he simply ignores the bulk
of  recent  scholarly  literature  that  addresses  pragmatism’s  relation  to  Kant  and  the
Kantian  tradition  of  transcendental  philosophy.3 If  you  are  attacking  a  certain
interpretation of a given philosophical tradition, you should of course seriously consider
the scholarly contributions that would be opposed to your preferred line of thought. This
is what Maddalena spectacularly fails to do.
8 Far from accepting Maddalena’s conclusion that “one cannot understand pragmatism if
one’s anti-Cartesianism is  not supplemented by a profound anti-Kantianism” (28),  we
should in my view observe that pragmatism actually completes Kant’s transcendental
(critical)  revolution,  and  should  continue  to  do  so.  The  claim  that  the  pragmatist
“revolution” should be “completed” by going anti-Kantian is to lead pragmatism to an
entirely wrong track. It is precisely in its deep Kantianism – albeit reconceptualizing and
thus moving beyond while critically preserving Kant’s original views – that pragmatism
radically departs from, e.g., mainstream analytic philosophy. Pragmatism and Kantianism
are on the same side in the battle against the kind of metaphysical realism (or what Kant
would  have  called  transcendental  realism)  that  proposes,  for  instance,  to  reveal  the
fundamental  metaphysical  structure  of  the  world independently  of  the conditions  of
human categorization, representation, and inquiry.
9 Maddalena could in fact do most that he is aiming to do in his book without claiming to
take any radical departure from Kant (or from pragmatism’s Kantianism). He could still
discuss reasoning, the concept of gesture, and creativity more or less in the way he does,
and he could find intriguing philosophical ideas in literary narrative and explore the
relevance of gesture in writing and education, for instance, even without claiming these
discussions to be based on any radical anti-Kantianism. Thus, while my remarks above
have  been  sharply  critical,  their  purpose  is  not  at  all  to  undermine  the  ideas  and
arguments Maddalena is actually developing in his book. My aim has only been to suggest
that he – or the pragmatist inspired by his “philosophy of gesture” – could develop these
ideas  and  arguments  without  giving  up  pragmatism’s (undetachable)  attachment  to
Kantianism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALLISON H. E., (2004 [1983]), Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: Interpretation and Defense – a
Revised and Enlarged Edition, New Haven, CT and London, Yale University Press.
GAVA G., & R. STERN, (eds.), (2016), Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy, London and
New York, Routledge.
MCMAHON J. A., (2014), Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant’s Pragmatist Legacy, London and
New York, Routledge.
Anti-Kantianism, an Anti-Pragmatist Gesture
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-1 | 2016
3
MADDALENA G., (2015), The Philosophy of Gesture: Completing Pragmatists’ Incomplete Revolution
, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, (with a Foreword by Fernando Zalamea).
MURPHEY M. G., (1968), “Kant’s Children: The Cambridge Pragmatists,” Transactions of the Charles
S. Peirce Society 4, 3-33
PIHLSTRÖM S., (2010), “Kant and Pragmatism,” Pragmatism Today, 1-15.
NOTES
1. All references, if not otherwise noted, will be to Maddalena 2015.
2. I try to explain how and why the pragmatist ought to subscribe something like this one world
account of transcendental idealism in Pihlström 2010. For a classical statement of the one world
reading, in my view open to a pragmatist rearticulation, see Allison 2004.
3. Among  the  most  recent  contributions,  one  could  mention,  e.g.,  Gava  &  Stern  2016;  and
(focusing more on ethics and aesthetics) McMahon 2014. Of course, Maddalena could not have
consulted  Gava’s  and  Stern’s  very  recent  collection,  but  the  basic  idea  of  pragmatism  as  a
naturalized  and  historicized  rearticulation  of  Kantian  transcendental  philosophy  has  been
discussed in scholarly literature at least since Murphey 1968.
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